This article looks back at the brief life of the communist organisation Red Fightback from the perspective of a participant from mid–2020 to its demise in January 2023. The overall assessment is that the organisation was a juvenile and mistaken experiment, but one from which some lessons can be drawn. This framing is not intended to insult the former members – after all, I share in this embarrassment and cannot claim to have known better at the time, having spent almost three years as a member. What follows is an analysis of the shortcomings of the organisation, how these contributed to the group’s failure, and a tentative proposal for an alternative approach to building a class–independent party which can better live up to the aspiration of challenging the foundations of capitalist rule.
Anti–strategy
Red Fightback (RFB) grew in membership following the collapse of Corbynism during 2020 but had been established two years prior by disenchanted members of various far–left sects, principally the Communist Party of Great Britain – Marxist–Leninist and the Revolutionary Communist Group (RCG). New members were attracted to an organisation which eschewed reformism and compromise; took a broadly favourable view of historic socialist states and Global South liberation movements; had a strong commitment to intersectionality around gender and disability; and, above all, was orientated towards militant action over left introspection. In short, it filled a gap for activists who rejected the class–collaborationism of the Labour Party, the nay–saying of the Trotskyist sects, and the dull anti–intellectualism of the Communist Party of Britain and its Young Communist League (CPB/YCL). This immediate appeal tapped into a real need for better organisations, but it was also a product of a strategic fudge – in essence, a deferral of the question of strategy – which ultimately formed a weak basis for future organisational development.
RFB’s foundational strategic document set out the group’s intention to coordinate and radicalise the broader working class movement into a force able to revolutionise society. This agenda was first laid out in a 2018 Central Committee statement “A Class Analysis of the Current Material Conditions in Britain and Our Strategy for Revolution”, which was never subjected to further deliberation or revision. Following an analysis of British class dynamics and Labour Party reformism, this document argued that
to overthrow capitalism and end British imperialism we must build a grassroots movement uniting and educating all people that are oppressed under capitalism, [and] we must lead them in class struggle while developing our theory and practices, consistent with the material conditions in Britain and necessary to bring about a revolution.[1]
The document went on to emphasise the central theme of “forging links with the working class”, becoming “rooted in our communities”, and “building a working–class community” to “spread class consciousness” and “develop both our own membership and to help to develop the masses”. The Central Committee planned to use community organising to spread class consciousness and acquire party members, and therefore grow in symbiosis with the wider working–class movement.
Whilst this was presented as a “strategy for revolution”, it was at most a strategy for short–term organisational growth. A strategy for revolution would imply a provisional plan for the seizure of power by the working class, not simply a plan for how to build up the working class movement into a force capable of this.
This short–term perspective was a deliberate choice, based on humility about the organisation’s level of development and ability to create prescriptions for the future. The Central Committee stated that “it is impossible at this stage to predict the exact nature of, or pathway towards, a socialist Britain”. This appears to echo Marx’s rejection of writing “recipes for the cookshops of the future”[2] or dreaming up “ready–made utopias”[3] to implement under socialism.[4] However, it goes two whole steps further than Marx and rejects not only prescriptions for the content of socialist society, but also prescriptions for its form (“exact nature”) and for the means of getting there (the “pathway towards” socialism). On the other hand, the phrase “at this stage” suggests that the authors thought these questions could be answered, but just not yet. In this way, this approach is best described as ‘anti–strategy’, or a deferral of the question of strategy to the future.
The party and the revolution
Refusing to theorise revolution created two existential problems for RFB, the first being lack of clarity around the question of ‘the party’. RFB’s founders correctly recognised that simply declaring, in the deluded manner of so many far–left sects, that your organisation is the revolutionary party is futile. However, without an accompanying theory of how the revolutionary party would be created and what role the organisation would play within this, this insight was worthless. RFB was therefore stuck in an awkward limbo in relation to the party form, whereby its members were aware of the necessity of a political party for the working class but collectively they were taking no action towards creating this party.
The second problem created by not defining revolution was that it rendered RFB’s self–identification as “revolutionary” somewhat uncertain in meaning. Elsewhere in the strategy document and throughout the organisation’s life, RFB defined itself precisely by its revolutionism and its opposition to reformism. But without a definition of what a revolution actually is, or what an organisation seeking to make a revolution should be doing, the delineation between reform and revolution becomes meaningless. This turns revolutionism into an amorphous concept, that implies a rejection of half–measures or quietude, but little more. Without any substantial content of its own, all that is really left of revolutionism as practice is identification with revolutions through iconography and declarations of support, and radical–sounding condemnations of reformists. As a consequence, this version of ‘revolutionism’ lends itself to becoming an aesthetic and rhetorical posture rather than a real political orientation.
Both of these problems left RFB vague and unconfident of purpose, which, tragically, undermined the only concrete aim it had: recruitment of members through community organising. What RFB’s strategists overlooked was that, by having no answers to the question of how to achieve socialism or what it will look like, you remove precisely the appeal of a communist party to organic intellectuals and campaigners of the working class. The potential appeal of a party for campaigners is the promise of a credible political challenge to the social order which produces the “horrors of capitalism” against which campaigns fight. Without this hope – however remote – membership of the communist party would only represent a distraction from campaigning with no clear purpose. After all, if the party’s activity only consists of community campaigning, why not just continue to be a community campaigner? Joining a communist organisation represents a significant leap of faith: it is reasonable to fear it could lead to social ostracisation, losing your job, or all kinds of trouble you don’t want (particularly if that party uses radical and ‘scary’ revolutionary rhetoric and imagery in its agitation). To take such a leap requires having faith that you are joining an organisation which has legitimate political aims and some chance of realising them. When members of the organisation cannot explain how they intend to achieve their political aims or even what they are, non–members are unlikely to take this leap of faith.
Unsurprisingly, the tactic of recruitment through community organising failed. I was in the most active branch of Red Fightback, and I was not aware of a single instance of a grassroots campaigner joining the party after engaging with us during a campaign. This is anecdotal of course, and there may have been examples, but it was certainly not effective on the scale anticipated. I believe that the lack of a credible vision of socialism or a motivating theory of change played a significant role in this failure.
Attempts at re–alignment
Once it became clear that things were not working as they should, the leadership made several attempts to reinvigorate the party, but these failed.
The first thing the leadership tried was imposing bureaucratic ‘activity quotas’ on members. These were intended to be guidance rather than requirement, and failure to meet them only meant a discussion between a member and their designated ‘branch rep’, rather than disciplinary action. All this achieved was the creation of a bureaucratic atmosphere, without even the questionable benefit of forcing members into action.
Finally, far too late, the leadership realised that the problem lay in the deficit of ideas and democratic input in the organisation’s strategy and began an internal ‘strategy consultation’. This was the first serious recognition of strategic failure and represented an attempt to move towards more open discussion. This approach could have been fruitful; however, the members were already mostly disengaged, and the consultation progressed at a snail’s pace. The party also did not possess the necessary forum and political culture to engage members in strategy.
For members to take an active role in a party’s political life, they need a party journal and a culture of openness about disagreement. They need a journal, because strategic thinking requires long–form writing, rather than scattered memos and speeches at meetings. This is particularly apparent at the national level: even in RFB, at over 200 members it was impossible to hold a national debate about strategy in the form of a meeting. Members need a culture of open political disagreement, including the freedom to take up adversarial positions, so that ideas are properly scrutinised and developed. Without constant scrutiny and re–evaluation, not only does strategy become weak, but, as Mike McNair has highlighted, the membership is also “dumbed down” politically through its exclusion from high–level political discussion.[5]
A culture of secrecy
Open discussion was difficult to engender in RFB because this impulse was always in tension with its deep–rooted culture of secrecy. This culture was a product of RFB’s reactive ‘revolutionism’, which consisted mainly of acting as if we were imminently going to be leading an insurrection. This was an attempt to reverse–engineer a revolutionary party by imitating the form of a clandestine, military organisation in the hope that this would produce a revolutionary mission. This was a kind of vicious cycle: without space for open debate, the appropriateness of this stifling clandestinity could not be seriously challenged. Like the hierarchies which emerge under ‘the tyranny of structurelessness’[6], guiding ideals which are not openly expressed are especially difficult to dislodge. This was the case for RFB’s implicit commitment to leading an insurrection and therefore also its ultra–secretive mode of operation.
The culture of secrecy created an oppressive atmosphere and a tendency to self–censor. All communication was conducted on alternative ‘secure’ platforms (Mattermost instead of Discord, Jitsi instead of Zoom, etc), comrades knew each other by initials only, meetings were remote with cameras–off and so on. This was partly just Covid–19 and general antisociality – the Central Committee at one point actually decreed cameras to be turned on in meetings – but it was heavily influenced by the belief that we were participants in some kind of revolutionary conspiracy.
That’s all folks!
The succession of failed strategies and the generally oppressive atmosphere took a heavy toll on the membership and led to their increasing disengagement from the party. The malaise grew steadily, until collapse seemed all but certain. More and more members quietly checked out of the party’s activities. I for one had totally disengaged for over 6 months by the time the hammer fell.
In the end, RFB’s demise took the form of sudden self–destruction. A scandalous dispute had been brewing in the Central Committee and came to a head dramatically and decisively when the website and comms server disappeared overnight. Of course, whilst the dispute was apparently long–running, very few ordinary members knew anything about it until afterwards, and, even then, they knew little more than rumours. One prominent rumour was that a personal relationship, perhaps romantic and perhaps between members of the Central Committee, had broken down into mutual accusations of abuse and anti–Blackness.
One comrade (who was closer to the situation than me) has therefore painstakingly analysed the final incident as a symptom of broader issues around failings of solidarity and anti–racism on the left in Britain.[7] Whilst they provide a thoughtful reflection on these themes, this comrade is perhaps missing the wood for the trees. What is more pertinent to external observers and to posterity is the simple fact that the organisation was torn apart by interpersonal bitterness and toxicity, in a process which ordinary members had no knowledge of and no power to stop. Leadership should be subject to scrutiny, discipline, and, if necessary, recall by membership; the membership should have the skills and experience needed to become leaders when required; and all digital and other assets of the party should be democratically controlled.
The actual dissolution of the party encapsulated its fundamental problems spectacularly: the ‘rage–deletion’ of the comms server by an embittered individual, over the heads of not only the membership but also the Central Committee itself. This is not something which happens in a healthy, democratic organisation which lives its mission of transforming society towards a system of solidarity, care, and collective emancipation.
The finality of this act of digital sabotage, which killed the party outright, demonstrated that – despite great pretensions to the contrary – the party branches had little cohesion on the ground and the party’s life was mostly lived online. In one unforgiving motion, the trench coat was torn off to reveal two embarrassed Discord servers balanced on each other’s shoulders. A real Looney Tunes moment, which punctured the party’s image of itself as a secretive and disciplined band of professional revolutionaries. There was no doubt that this was the end, and it was.
The last laugh
The harsh portrait I have given of Red Fightback might make pleasing reading for the other far left groups and would undoubtedly provoke much laughter from the (ever–so–sensible) reformists. However, despite their organisations’ comparative success and endurance, both reformism and the fragmented, sectarian revolutionary left are just as much dead ends for the socialist movement.
The case against reformism hardly needs repeating here. Reformism demands we sacrifice everything and gain nothing; we must cosy up with our class enemies and keep quiet about capitalism and imperialism, all in pursuit of power which we never seem to reach. Reformism survives only on illusions fed by cycles of hope and despair, and eternally puts off the real question: how to overcome the power of the capitalists, their states, media, and military to achieve the self–emancipation of the working class of the whole world.
The case against the revolutionary left in its current state is more complex. Firstly, it should be noted that Red Fightback’s theoretical criticisms of the existing far–left groups were in general correct. Its critique of the anti–trans politics of the CPB/YCL and others was valuable and necessary. It stood out on the left in Britain for its opposition to oppression around race, disability and gender, and did valuable work to expose the eugenic logic of the government’s austerity policies and Covid–19 response. It criticised the male chauvinist culture of the YCL and the harbouring of sexual abusers in organisations like the Socialist Workers Party and the RCG, and sought to overcome this tendency from the outset with a robust zero–tolerance policy on sexual violence and abusive behaviour. The leadership put great energy into educating prospective members about oppressive behaviours and made understanding and acceptance of these principles a condition of membership. The existing left’s failures in these areas are shameful and will only impede their organisational effectiveness, particularly in the education and development of new cadre.
On the other hand, on a strategic level, the existing revolutionary left is just as bankrupt as Red Fightback was. At best, they emulate Red Fightback’s ultra–revolutionary posturing in a slightly more convincing way. At worst, they collapse into reformism and sacrifice their political independence into whatever the latest broad left project is.
Is there another road?
The task of self–identified revolutionaries should not be to try to create a new, better sect, but to overcome the fragmentation and isolation of the sects to create a communist party which can chart a revolutionary course between opportunism and ultra–leftism. This requires: unity around a political programme (not around theory, interpretations of socialist history, or whatever else); merging socialism with the workers movement; maintaining this class–independent party and building up our own media, cooperatives and international ties; pursuing a strategy of patience which seeks to build majority support for socialism and refuses to enter coalitions or take ministerial positions in bourgeois governments; and developing an inspiring vision for a democratic republic through which workers can rule, whilst prefiguring this state in our own party.
This is an outline for an alternative model of ‘revolutionism’, which could be communist, internationalist, anti–imperialist, anti–racist, queer, and liberatory, whilst also being genuinely democratic and taking seriously the question of a strategy for power. It is the antithesis to the reactive revolutionism of Red Fightback, and a challenge to the remaining sects who follow similar models. I invite comrades in these organisations to engage with, debate and challenge these ideas to bring us closer to a strategy for communist unity.
- An digitally archived version of the statement is available via the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine: https://web.archive.org/web/20191204200453/https://redfightback.org/a–class–analysis–of–the–current–material–conditions–in–britain–and–our–strategy–for–revolution/↩︎
- Marx, Capital Vol. 1, ‘Afterword to the second German edition’, MECW Vol. 35, p. 17.↩︎
- Marx, The Civil War in France, MECW Vol. 22, p. 335.↩︎
- Even this doctrine should not be unassailable in our present context. The negative experiences and perceptions of 20th Century socialism may in fact make some positive visions of socialist society a necessary exercise for Marxists, to help recover the emotive pull that the socialist horizon once possessed.↩︎
- McNair, ‘Dumbness of dumbing down’, Weekly Worker issue 1449. https://weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1449/dumbness-of-dumbing-down/↩︎
- See the essay of the same name by Jo Freeman: https://www.jofreeman.com/joreen/tyranny.htm↩︎
- https://www.ebb–magazine.com/essays/red–fightbacks–final–crisis↩︎
Picture: 《人民画报》, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
